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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the
character of public reason in theory justice in the
works of John Rawls Political Liberalism, The idea of
public reason revisited and Justice as Fairness: A
restatement, with the interpretation to identifying a
pragmatic justification in the theory of justice as
fairness. 
Keywords: public reason; political conception of
justice; theory of justice as fairness. 
Statement of the Problem
The problem is that we intend to investigate the
character that takes on the quality of public reason in
the theory of justice developed by Rawls. The basic
issue is to identify how Rawls understands the
possibility of a foundation of the principles of justice
for the basic structure of society, providing
opportunities for a minimum common basis for the
stability and legitimacy, defending a cognitivist
position based on public values (moral and political)
of freedom and equality, assuming an ideal of
democratic citizenship and the duty of civility on the
issues essential elements of justice and constitutional
essentials, from a pragmatic justification in a public
context. One of the main problems addressed by Rawls
is about the moral justification, i.e. to establish a
foundation of moral principles and judgments,
refusing both the fundamentalist position as the
skeptical position or emotivism. Rawls required
countering the numerousness moral interpretation,
which identified the impossibility of justification of
moral judgments because of its subjectivity linked to
emotions, arguing for the objectivity of these
judgments and the ability of people to be more or less
reasonable. 
We can point out three methods of justification
in the theory of justice as fairness: (i) the balance
reflective (reflective equilibrium), (ii) the original
position under the veil of ignorance and (iii) idea of
public reason. The reflective equilibrium is an intuitive
and inductive method, because it justifies the
principles of justice from the moral judgments of
converging public culture of a democratic society such
as religious tolerance and rejection of slavery.1 It is
clearly the appeal on the grounds of intuitionistic
identification of that freedom and equality are good,
which favors the classification of Rawls' theory of
justice as a comprehensive doctrine. The method of the
original position is theoretical and deductive, the
principles are justified because they are derived from a
formal model of correctness, which is the veil of
ignorance, which imposes formal deduction, and
institutions are just as if these principles and being fair
distribution if it conforms to the institutions.2 In turn,
the idea of public reason states that the constitutional
issues and the essential elements of basic justice are
affirmed from the political values that can be endorsed
by all citizens in the form of an overlapping consensus
between comprehensive doctrines, which shows a
closeness with pragmatism
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there is a certain line of continuity between the three
methods in relation to a cognitivist position refusing
antirealism. Intuitionism's reflective equilibrium brings
to us as close to moral realism when it happens an
identifying cooperation as that which is good.
Otherwise, the theoretical and deductive original
position reveals a constructivist perspective, in which
the principles are justified from a construction method
that maintains proximity with a kind of moral
idealism, although Rawls's political constructivism
cannot be equated Kantian moral constructivism by
abstracting the concept of truth. In short, the idea of
public reason seems to be located in a horizon of
pragmatic reasons, as it seeks to achieve an overlapping
consensus between different comprehensive doctrines.
However, it seems that this pragmatism includes an
intuitionistic character of moral realism by asserting
the intrinsic value of moral and political duties, which
approximates a position of refusal to anti- realism.
The Idea of Public Reason
The idea of public reason can be found in
Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, it was John Rawls who
brought this idea into play in contemporary political
philosophy. Rawls's conception of public reason is
represents one of the most influential accounts of
contemporary liberal philosophy responds to the
question of religious and other so-called
comprehensive doctrines in political philosophy.The
public reason is the relation of citizens as they share
the status of citizenship and its object is the public
good in a public conception of justice that has a public
basis of justification. Rawls reinterprets the concept of
public reason as used by Kant in Reply to the question:
Public reason then, its three guidelines, namely: “as the
reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public;
its object is the good of the public and matters of
fundamental justice; and its nature and content is
public, being given by the society’s conception of
political justice, and conducted open to view on that
basis.”3
At first feature of public reason and its specific
object is the relation of citizens who are equal, forming
a collective body, exercising political power of some
over others. The limits imposed on public reason to
circumscribe the political questions " constitutional
essential and question of basic justice,"4 this means
that political values should resolve the fundamental
questions such as, for example, “who has the right to
vote, or what religions are be tolerated, or  who is to be
assured fair equality of opportunity or to hold
property.”5 These are significant issues clearly specify
the proper object of public reason. Another key feature
of public reason is that its limits do not apply to
discussions and individual reflections on the political
issues, which characterize the culture background of a
group, applying specifically for citizens, “when they
engage in political advocacy in the public forum.”6 It
is imperative to observe a proper distinction of the
application form to the ideal of public reason for
citizens and state authorities: the ideal of public reason
applies in official forums which are the legislative,
executive and judiciary. It is applied to the legislature
and the executive while they are on the public address
space. In the sphere of the judiciary, especially the
Supreme Court applies in particular the idea of public
reason, because "[...] the justice have to explain and
justify their decisions as based on their understanding
of the constitution and relevant statutes and
precedents,"7 characterizing the judiciary as an
exemplary case of public reason, due to it being
restricted to issues and the fundamental constitutional
questions of basic justice, taking into account the limits
imposed by the democratic constitution and the
general welfare.
A key issue at stake is to know that citizens would
not use the limits of public reason to decide on key
policy issues, not using a comprehensive conception of
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truth, using only “to a public conception of justice.”8
This apparent paradox is resolved with the use of a
liberal principle of legitimacy that has two
fundamental characteristics, namely, first, “it is a
relationship of persons within the basic structure of
society into which they are born and in which they
normally lead a complete life. Second, in a democracy
political power, which is always coercive power, is the
power of the public, that is, of free and equal citizens
as a collective body.”9 Rawls concerns as a permanent
feature of public culture of a democratic society the
diversity of religious, philosophical and moral
doctrines and not a historical contingency. As a result,
citizens should exercise their political power based on
principles and ideas of public justice, and this
characterizes the liberal principle of legitimacy.
Disappears, thus the paradox of the use of public
reason for citizens to deliberate on key policy issues,
depending on the design policy is supported by an
overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines and
reasonable. This means that “citizens affirm the ideal of
public reason, not as a result of political compromise,
as in a modus vivendi, but from within their own
reasonable doctrines.”10 This apparent paradox of
public reason is terminated due to be perfectly
reasonable to dispense with the truth as a whole for a
demonstration in the political sphere, as seen in cases
where the rules of evidence limit the testimony that
can be introduced, aimed at the defendant a trial fair,
“not only is hearsay evidence excluded but also
evidence gained by improper searches and seizures.”11
It is imperative is to think about the scope of public
reason as the space of key issues aimed at the common
good within the political community.
Aiming to clarify the suitable form of public
reason, Rawls sets out distinctions between this and
the reason for non-public. A first explanation
highlights that “there are many nonpublic reasons and
but only one reason .among the non-public reasons
are, those of associations of all kinds: churches and
universities, scientific societies and professional
groups.”12 The reasons are social, non-public, part of
the cultural horizon background of a society, including
the “many reasons of civil society, and belong to what
I have called the “background culture” in contrast with
the public political culture.”13 The reasons for non-
public use criteria and methods differ depending on
the way to interpret the nature of the problem and
purpose of each association and the conditions which
seek to achieve their ends. Rawls notes that in a
democratic society citizens regarded as free and equal,
whether comprehensive religious, philosophical or
moral views, and this is the dominion of political
competence, specified by constitutional rights and
liberties.14 However, government’s authority cannot be
accepted in this way (free) as a function of individuals
are always inserted in a political community, and is
therefore necessary to consider the scope of public
reason for the validation of government power.
The Content of Public Reason
To understand the content of public reason it is
significant to recall that it is developed within political
liberalism, which as the name implies is a conception
of justice which is in a sense liberal, and in a sense
political.  It is liberal in the sense that it specifies
certain rights, limits and opportunities.  It also assigns
these rights and opportunities a special priority,
especially regarding the general good.  Importantly, it
assures the measures that allow citizens to realistically
take advantage of these rights, and the conditions
which encourage them to be bound by the limits.  It is
political in the sense that it applies only to the basic
structure of society, and in the sense that it is
freestanding; that is, it is independent from any single
comprehensive doctrine.Finally, it is elaborated in
terms of fundamental, implicit ideas of a public,
political, democratic society.  
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The content of public reason is expressed by
"political conception of justice" of a liberal character,
and that means three things: first, it specifies certain
basic rights, liberties and opportunities( of the kind
familiar from constitutional democratic regimes);
second, it assigns a special priority to these rights,
liberties and opportunities especial with respect to
claims of the  general good and perfectionist values,
and third, it  affirms  measures assuring all citizens
adequate all –purpose means to make effective  use of
their basic liberties and opportunities.”15 The two
principles of justice (the principle of equal liberty and
the principles of equal opportunity and difference)
appear as the content of public reason and that
explains the meaning of a political conception of
justice that: (i) that it is framed apply solely to the basic
structure of society (ii) presents an independent view
of any comprehensive doctrine and (iii) is drafted in
terms of fundamental political ideas. It is important to
clarify the guidelines of inquiry for applying the
principles of justice. So a liberal political conception
must include: (a) substantive principles of justice for
the basic structure, (b) guidelines for inquiry:
principles of reasoning and rules of evidence in the
light of which citizens are to decide whether
substantive principles properly apply and to identify
laws and policies that best satisfy them."16 Following
this argument, it appears that the liberal political values
are also of two types, of which the first type (the values
of political justice) belongs to the same class as the
principles of justice for the basic structure and the
second type (values of public reason) belongs to the
same category of guidelines for public inquiry that
make this kind of independent and public inquiry. 
The basic structure of society and its public
policies are to be justifiable to all citizens, according to
the principle of political legitimacy requires. When
performing the justifications, as required by the
principle of political legitimacy, “to presently accepted
general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in
common sense and the methods and conclusions of
science when these are not controversial.”17 This
interpretation emphasizes that, as a liberal conception
of justice as fairness, “specify the guidelines of public
reason as well as its principle of legitimacy, have the
same basis as the substantive principles of justice, this
meaning in justice as fairness that the parties in the
original position, in adopting the principles of justice
for basic structure, must also adopt guidelines and
criteria of public reason for the applying those
norms.”18 It is important to realize that accepting the
idea of public reason, and also the principle of
legitimacy does not mean accepting a particular liberal
conception of justice in all its aspects and principles of
content and, “The point of the ideal of public reason is
that in citizens are to conduct theirs fundamental
discussions within the framework of what each regards
as a political conception of justice based on values that
the others can reasonably be expected to endorse and
each is in good faith, prepared to defend that
conception so understood.”19
For reviews concerning the scope of a political
conception of justice is necessary to establish the
elements that are essential constitutional principles that
specify, the overall structure of the government and the
political process and equal rights that must comply
with legislative majorities are to respect. These
constitutional elements of the first kind, that specify
the overall structure of the government and the
political process, may be specified in several ways, for
example, “Witness the difference between a
presidential or cabinet government”. But once settled it
is vital that the structure of government be changed
only as experience shows it to be required by political
justice or the general good,”20 but never on the basis
of individual interests for the attainment of more
power. The constitutional elements of the second kind
concern basic rights and fundamental liberties can
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only be specified in but one way, namely, a module
subject to relatively few changes in order to establish
the guarantee of liberty of conscience, and freedom of
association etc... From this analysis establishes a
further distinction between the principles of justice
that specify the rights and liberties and the principles
governing the fundamental questions of distributive
justice, social and economic inequalities and
foundations of social self-respect. Both principles
express political values, but their differences are
coordinated in different roles of the basic structure of
society, that in the first express, we have the
specification and guarantee basic rights and liberties,
establishing fair procedures, and the second express,
“it sets up the creation of background institutions of
social and economic justice appropriate to citizens as
free and equal”21 (Rawls, PL p. 228). Presents four
reasons to distinguish between the elements essential
constitutional freedoms specified by the principles that
regulate social and economic inequalities, namely: (a)
“The two kinds of principles Specify  different roles for
the basic structure , (b ) It is more urgent to settle the
essential dealing with the basic freedoms (c) it is fair
easier to tell whether those essentials are realized (d) it
much  easier to gain agreement about what the basic
rights and liberties  should be, not in every detail of
course, but about the main outlines.”22 A political
conception of justice encompasses the essential
constitutional elements and issues of basic justice and
be limited to the question of “freedom of movement
and free choice of occupation, and a social minimum
covering citizens basic needs count as constitutional
essentials while  the principle of  fair opportunity and
the difference principle do not.”23
For Rawls, the Supreme Court is considered an
exemplary case of public reason, as “the public
reason is the reason of its supreme court.”24
Outline, initially, two issues, namely: (i) that
public reason is suitable to be the court’s reason in the
exercise of highest judicial, but not the interpreter of
the higher law and (ii) that the Supreme Court is the
branch most characteristic of the government that
serves as the exemplar of public reason. These
questions are set from the identification of five
principles of constitutionalism: (i) the distinction
between constituent power of the people to establish a
new regime and the common power of government
officials exercised daily, (ii) the distinction between
common law and the law more High in the higher law
(constitutional law) restricts and guides this ordinary
power, (iii) the constitution is the highest example of
the law, (iv) through a democratic constitution, citizens
provide essential constitutional elements, such as rights
and fundamental freedoms, freedom of expression and
association, freedom of movement, choice of
occupation and the protections of the rule of law, (v)
the supreme power of a constitutional government
must belong to the three branches in a specific
relationship with one another with each  responsible to
the people.25
It is identified a duality in constitutional
democracy, it is possible to distinguish the constituent
power of the ordinary, and the supreme court must be
in tune with the idea of constitutional democracy in
order to defend the law at its most high. The Supreme
Court is then presented as the exemplary institution of
public reason, being a function of judges to express the
best interpretations of the constitution, cannot use
personal criteria for judging, as religious doctrines,
philosophical or moral, appealing only to the political
values that are part of the political conception of
justice. An essential role of the court as an institution
exemplar of public reason is to give strength and
vitality to public reason in a forum that is also public,
interpreting the constitution effectively in a reasonable
method.
21 Ibid,
22 Ibid, p,230
23 Ibid, 
24 Ibid, p,231
25 Ibid, pp,231-32
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What is at stake is to find a political concept
based on values of justice and public reason to reach a
reasonable time and may join in an agreement on key
political issues, namely issues involving basic
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. A
first difficulty of this scheme notes “that public reason
often allows more than one reasonable answer to any
particular question, this is because there are many
political values and many ways they can be
characterized.”26 The answer to this problem lies the
specific horizon of public reason in a purely political,
considering that public reason does not establish the
requirement of all accept the same principles, “but
rather to conduct our fundamental discussions in
terms of what we regard as a  political conception.”27
“A second difficulty concerns what is means by voting
our sincere opinion.28 Therefore, it is essential to
identify three conditions for the respect of public
reason and the principle of legitimacy, namely: (a) it is
assigned great weight to the ideal that he prescribes,
(ii) it is believed that the reason the public is
adequately complete (iii) it is believed that the vision
of citizens expressed a specific combination and a
reasonable balance with the political values. The key
question is whether the citizens, to use only political
values to decide on key issues, not using
comprehensive doctrines, they are being sincere. Rawls
believes that the beliefs in comprehensive doctrines are
consistent with the three conditions presented. From
this perspective, only the unreasonable comprehensive
doctrines come into disagreement with the public
reason, not sustaining a reasonable balance of political
values. “A third difficulty is to specify when a question
is successfully resolved by public reason.”29
Rawls's approach emphasizes a complete political
conception of justice, in which its political values
admit a balance that provides a reasonable response to
all key issues (or almost all). To achieve greater clarity
of positioning, there are mentioned four extension
problems: “One is extending justice to cover our duties
to future generations (under which fall the problem of
just savings).Another is the problem of extending it to
the conception and principle that apply to
international law and political relations between
peoples- the traditional jus gentium. A third problem
of extension is that of setting out the principles of
normal health care; and finally, we may ask whether
justice can be extended to our relations to animals and
the order of nature.”30 The position is defended that
justice as fairness can account for the first three issues
from a vision of a social contract that is recognized the
status of full citizens of a society. From this
contractarian view, it is thought towards the future,
compared to other generations in the outward
direction, in relation to other companies, and the
internal sense in covering those requiring normal
health care. The fourth issue, on an environmental
ethic should be resolved from non-political values in
which each one decides from their comprehensive
doctrines and try to convince others of our position,
not being able to apply the limits of public reason in
these cases.
From this analysis, it is important to the question
of when a key question is settled by public reason. The
resolution of an issue for public reason to reach the
reasonable (reasonable), i.e., an overlapping consensus
of comprehensive doctrines that identify a specific
political. Aiming to continue the argument about the
limits of public reason, Rawls introduces a unique
vision in research and inclusive. In the exclusive view,
the reasons offered in terms of comprehensive
doctrines should never be introduced into public
reason in relation to key policy issues. “This exclusive
view, there is another view allowing  citizens, in certain
situations, to present what they regard as the basis of
political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine,
provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal
of public reason itself.”31
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The ideal of public reason must be understood
according to the inclusive vision, because it allows a
wider range of political reasons (exclusive and
inclusive), depending on the specific case, therefore,
more flexible. Rawls offers two examples on the issue:
(i) a more or less well-ordered, with a strong
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines and
respect to the ideal of public reason. Thus, the public
reason that well-ordered society is in agreement with
the exclusive view, because only rely on political values,
respecting the ideal of public reason, (ii) a more or less
well-ordered, with a conflict about the principle of fair
equality of opportunity with regard to education for all,
this conflict regarding the government support for
public schools only, or also support for church schools.
May be crucial that the various groups are obliged to
explain his reasons, addressing how to own
comprehensive doctrine confirms the political values
in a public forum.32 These examples presented
emphasize the need for mutual support between the
political conception and its ideal of public reason to
achieve stability in “a well-ordered society publicly and
effectively regulated by a recognized political
conception fashions a climate within which its citizens
acquire a sense of justice inclining them to meet their
duties of civility.” 33
The ideal of public reason is understood as a
complement to a constitutional democracy
characterized culturally by a plurality of reasonable
comprehensive doctrines. The types of policy issues
applied to public reason are issues relating to
constitutional essential elements and questions of basic
justice. The object of public reason applies to citizens
as is involved in public issues. More specifically, it
applies to public authorities and governmental
organizations in official forums. In particular, the
public reason applies to the judiciary, both in their
decisions as in his exemplary constitutional
requirement of public reason. 
The content of public reason is offered by the
political conception of justice and constitutes the
substantive principles of justice for the basic structure
of society and the guidelines of inquiry and the
concepts of virtue that can make public reason. The
limits of public reason are in “the ideal of democratic
citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on
terms supported by public values that we might
reasonably expect others to endorse. The ideal also
expresses a willingness to listen to what others have to
say and being ready to accept reasonable
accommodations or alterations in one’s own view.”34
This interpretation of public reason represents a big
breakthrough because it highlights the role of the duty
of civility as an ideal of democracy and considers the
content of public reason only the political values and
guidelines of a political conception of justice, not being
related to a design comprehensive moral, however, this
view is close to a substantive moral theory, for it
appeals to moral-political values as civility,
reasonableness (mutual respect and civic friendship)
and citizenship.
The scope of public reason to start thinking about
what is the theoretical scope of the category of public
reason in the theory of justice of Rawls, we take as a
starting point the analysis carried out by Habermas in
Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks
on John Rawls' political liberalism. Habermas's
investigation concerns the relationship between the
private and the public autonomy in Rawls, who
understands of public reason.35 When reviewing the
procedural form of practical reason, in the form of
public use of reason, those principles are valid which
can be free object recognition in terms of
intersubjective discourse. Habermas wants to analyze
the model in its proceduralist Rawlsian political fallout
in the form of the democratic constitutional
government. The discussion is limited to the
confrontation between the freedoms of modern,
32 See, Ibid, p,248
33 Ibid, p,252
34 Ibid, p,253
35 HABERMAS, J. 1995. Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ political liberalism. The
Journal of Philosophy, 92(3): p,126
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liberal, and the freedoms of former Republicans.
Liberals emphasize the individual liberties such as
freedom of belief and conscience, protection of life,
personal liberty and property, while Republicans
emphasize the freedoms objective, as the right of
political participation and communication that enable
self-determination of citizens.
For Habermas, “Rawls certainly proceeds from
the idea of political autonomy and models it at the level
of the original position”36 Thus, the legal protection of
privacy is a priority, while political freedoms have an
instrumental role in the preservation of other
freedoms. Habermas accuses Rawls of creating a
border in advance of autonomy in relation to public
autonomy, contradicting the intuition that the
republican popular sovereignty and human rights
derive from the same root and contradicting also the
historical experience, especially the fact that the
various boundaries between private and public
autonomy have always presented problems of
normative point of view. For Habermas, Rawls should
treat the political perspective of legal regulation, but
does so only in passing, to enable the dialectical
relationship between positive law and individual
liberties.37
Rawls responds to Habermas the objection,
analyzing the relationship between the liberties of
modern versus the will of the people in political
liberalism in the Replay text to Habermas. In
Habermas' interpretation, the modern liberal rights
overlap a priori determination of the democratic
process. Habermas argues that political liberalism
starts from the idea of political autonomy and models
at the original position. Rawls clarifies the
misunderstanding arguing from the idea of the four
stage sequence: (i) original position, where the parties
choose principles of justice, (ii) the parties, seeing
ourselves as delegates, seek to bring the principles and
rules of a constitution in the light of the principles of
justice already on hand, (iii) the shares are converted
into legislators, enacting laws as the constitution allow
and as the principles of justice require and permit, (iv)
the parties have assumed the role of judges interpreting
the constitution and laws as members of the Judiciary.
first, the following four-step process does not describe
an actual political or purely theoretical one, and
secondly, the misunderstanding may arise because of
the abstract idea of the original position as mechanism
of representation and imagining the parties for their
election and keeping the principles of perpetuity, “it is
part of justice as fairness and constitutes part of a
framework of thought that citizen in civil society who
accept justice as fairness are to use in applying its
concepts and principles.” 38
For Habermas, the public use of reason does not
have the sense of an actual exercise of political
autonomy, but that serves only the permanence of
political stability. Rawls claims that in the PL,
autonomy is understood as political rather than moral
autonomy. “The latter is a much wider idea and
belongs to comprehensive doctrines of the kind
associated with Kant and Mill. Political autonomy is
specified in terms of various political institutions and
practices.”39 We can restart the process of initial
radical democratic core of the original position in the
real life of society, for the following four -stages
sequence that citizens continually discuss questions of
political principles and social policy.
Habermas considers that the basic liberal rights
and democratic self-legislation limiting thus the
political sphere only fulfills an instrumental role. The
answer is that political liberties have an intrinsic moral
value-political, because the basic liberal rights such as
liberty of conscience, freedom of speech and thought,
are not in a pre-political domain; non-public values are
not viewed, as they might be in some comprehensive
[ 8 3 ]
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doctrine (such as rational intuitionism or natural law).
“We assume the idea of a dualistic constitutional
democracy found in John Locke in distinguishes the
people's constituent power to form, ratify and amend
a constitution from the ordinary power of legislators
and executives in everyday politics.”40 The sequence of
four steps believes that the liberties of modern are
constitutional subject to the will of the people
.Habermas pointed out  that the Rawlsians, proposal
the liberties of the moderns are a kind of natural law
(as in Kant, on his interpretation) and, therefore, they
are external substantive ideas that impose restrictions
on public will of the people. Justice as fairness in the
interpretation Rawlsians is a political conception of
justice and, even taking a moral conception; it is not
an instance of a doctrine of moral law. From this
political conception of justice, freedom of the moderns
do not impose restrictions on the constituent will of
the people as objects to Habermas, in the light of
justice as fairness is situated on a public basis of
justification that seeks the overlapping consensus
between reasonable comprehensive doctrines, from the
public reason.
As shown at The idea of public reason revisited
the idea of public reason is a constituent of a
conception of constitutional democratic society well-
ordered, because the form and content of this ratio are
integral to the very idea of democracy, which is
characterized by the idea reasonable pluralism, which
allows an overlapping consensus (overlapping
consensus) on the various comprehensive doctrines.
Citizens should consider what kinds of reasons can
create opportunities where common understandings
are key policy questions at issue. Therefore,” I proposed
that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth
or right be replaced by an idea of the politically
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.”41
The public reason specified in a deeper level the
moral and political values which are integral to the
relationship of a democratic constitutional government
with its citizens, based on the criterion of reciprocity,
characterized by “five different aspects: (i) the
fundamental political question to which it applies;(ii)
the persons to  whom it applies( government officials
and candidates for public office); (iii) its content as
given by a family of reasonable political conceptions of
justice;(iv) the application of these conception in
discussions of coercive norms to be enacted in the
form of legitimate law for a democratic people; and (v)
citizen’s checking that the principles derived from their
conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity.”42
The ideal of public reason is satisfied when
members of the executive, legislators, judges,
candidates (or even when citizens think of themselves
as legislators) act on the idea of public reason, that is,
explain to other citizens their reasons to support
fundamental political positions because of the political
conception of justice more reasonable, fulfilling “their
duty of civility to one another and to other citizens.”43
For Rawls, this duty of civility is not only a legal duty,
but it is intrinsically a moral duty, as well as other
duties politics. The idea of public reason is rooted in a
conception of democratic citizenship that is part of a
constitutional democracy, which entails consideration
of citizens as free and equal that relate specifically to
the basic structure of society from “the criterion of
reciprocity requires that when those terms are
proposed as the most reasonable terms are proposed
as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation.”44
Hence, the idea of political legitimacy, based on
reciprocity, states that our exercise of political power is
proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons
we would offer for our political actions are sufficient
and we think that other citizens might also reasonably
accept those reasons.
40 Ibid, pp.405-6
41 RAWLS, J. 2001. The idea of public reason revisited. In: The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Harvard University Press , p.132
42 Ibid, p.133
43 Ibid, p.135
44 Ibid, p.136
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The proper role of the criterion of reciprocity is
to specify the nature of political relations in a
democratic constitutional relationship of friendship as
a civic (civic friendship), settling into a deeper level the
basic political values, such as democratic citizenship
and the idea of legitimate law for a deliberative
democracy, because in deliberation, citizens exchange
views and debate the reasons that have as part of public
policy. “It is at this point that public reason is crucial.
For it characterizes such citizens’ reasoning concerning
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”45
It is for this reason that a citizen makes use of public
reason after they decide on a reasonable political
conception of justice from political values that can be
endorsed by other free and equal citizens, meeting the
criterion of reciprocity. Thus, the content of public
reason and developed by a family of political
conceptions of justice which are characterized by
substantive principles of justice that “specify the
religious liberties and freedoms of artistic expression
of equal citizen, as well as the substantive ideas of
fairness involving fair opportunity  and ensuring
adequate  all -purposes, assuming the discursive
conception of legitimacy (as in Habermas), as well as
Catholic view of common good and solidarity when
they are expressed in terms of political values.”46
The political values are specified by liberal
political conceptions of justice and fall within the
category of politics, and “these political conceptions
have three features: First, their principles apply to basic
political and social institutions (the basic structure of
society); Second, they can be  presented independently
from comprehensive doctrines of any kind (although
they may, of course, be supported by a reasonable
overlapping consensus of such doctrines); and Finally,
they  can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen
as implicit in the public political  culture of a
constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of
citizen as free and equal persons, and of society as a
fair system of cooperation.”47 So part of public reason
is to make use of a political conception to discuss key
policy issues. Thus, a political figure is only when the
social form is itself political: when it is implemented in
specific parts of the basic structure and its political and
social institutions. The examples of political values are:
(i) political autonomy, in contrast to moral autonomy,
(ii) duty of mutual help and compassion not religious,
(iii) ability and not deserving of moral worthiness, (iv)
interest in family and human life in order to ensure the
reproduction of society as opposed to a perfectionist
view of human life and family.
The range of values to which we may appeal,
according to Rawls, “is given by a family of political
conceptions of justice,” not just one conception, and
therefore there are “many forms of public reason
specified by a family of reasonable political
conceptions.”48 The content of public reason consists
in liberal values of political justice such as equal
political liberty, equal opportunity, social equality, and
liberal values of public reason such as guidelines for
public inquiry (publicity, transparency), reasonableness
and “a readiness to honor the duty of civility.”49 This
range of values is bounded by the criterion of
reciprocity.50 People are reasonable in the sense
specified by reciprocity when they are ready to propose
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation
and abide by them willingly, given the assurance that
others will likewise do so.
These are shows that, the role of public reason is
to enable a strong commitment from everyone
involved with the ideals and moral and political values
of a democratic society, using as a starting point the
criterion of reciprocity, which requires duty of civility,
which implies the defense of the virtue of civic
friendship  and a the ideal of democratic citizenship
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45 Ibid, p.139
46 Ibid, p.141-42.
47 Ibid, p.143
48Ibid, pp.140-41
49 Rawls, op cit, above note5, p.224
50 Rawls, op cit, above note42, p.14
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that is based on the  legitimate law, which means
defending the Principles of toleration and liberty of
conscience . The public reason set forth the common
thread, specifying the type of grounds on which
citizens base their political arguments to make political
justifications to one another on constitutional
essentials and basic elements of justice, specifying the
conditions of political argument. The ideas of truth and
correction based on comprehensive doctrines are
replaced by the idea of the politically reasonable
addressed to citizens as citizens, which means to affirm
the value of public legitimacy, noting that these public
conceptions of justice are “themselves intrinsically
moral ideas,”51 The public reason is the way to reason
and deliberate publicly appealing to the shared values
that are politically, “which specify the basic rights,
liberties and opportunities of citizens in basic society’s
structure”52
Concluding Remarks
The public reason does not work with the ideas
of truth or correctness that would be inferred from
comprehensive doctrines, but rather, uses the idea of
the politically reasonable that says moral values and
political norms from the criterion of reciprocity,
namely, the duty of civility , which implies the defense
of civic virtue of friendship and an ideal of democratic
citizenship, which is based on the legitimacy of the law,
which means defending the principles of tolerance and
freedom of conscience, ensuring the rights, freedoms
and opportunities of the basic citizens in the basic
structure of society.
What does this mean?  Rawls would be taking a
non-cognitivist position and anti-realism not to appeal
to the idea of truth or correctness of moral judgments
and political? We do not think this is the circumstance
because, with the statement of the criterion of
reciprocity in a context of legal legitimacy, Rawls is
setting an object reference to the multiplicity of
conflicting moral judgments. It is clear that this
objectivity is weaker than nurtured by the criteria of
truth and correctness. However, identified the
difficulty of an absolute basis, it would take for granted
a stronger reason, the public reason Rawlsian provides
guidance for determining the cognitive moral
judgments, being stronger than any reasoning and
weaker than a proper foundation . The objective
criterion of reciprocity is built based on a common
right of all citizens who take a strong public
commitment to political ideals and values, enabling the
construction of justice principles that establish the
defense of equal liberty, fair equality of opportunities
and difference.
Letter the statement of Rawls about the intrinsic
value of the duty of civility and democratic ideal of
citizenship, which means considering such duties as
absolutes, as having an end in them, and not just as
instrumental duties, such duties would its value given
by an extrinsic purpose. Rawls would not be endorsing
a pragmatic argument based on a Universalist
intuitionism moderated, which would affirm the reality
of moral duties, regardless of the diversity of political
consciousness in a plural society, without, however,
resort to a metaphysical reason that would allow the
knowledge of good and affirmation of the truth of
moral judgments? It seems that the method of public
reason provides a pragmatic justification as possible for
the overlapping consensus between reasonable
comprehensive doctrines, setting in public policy
based on reciprocity and also nurture a stronger
justification in claiming substantial amounts to moral
plurality. Thus, the criterion of objectivity is achieved
for the justification of moral principles and judgments
in a society characterized by moral diversity, implying
a rejection of non-realism, antirealism and 
skepticism.
51 Ibid, p.174
52 Ibid, p.180
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